



## COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

by Joshua Thiel

“Conventional wisdom holds that a government must expend ten times as much as insurgents in their efforts to contain insurgency” (Mataxis, 1994, p.7). Authors, experts, and military historians establish a variety of ratios for military engagements as a way of forecasting requirements and predicting outcomes. The U.S. Army teaches Second Lieutenants that three to one numerical superiority is the planning factor for a successful attack. However, in order to account for shifting demographics and various operating environments, the U.S. Army established five to one as the tactical number for an urban attack. Similarly in the Department of the Army’s *Handbook on Counter Insurgency*, produced in 2007 under the direction of General David Petraeus, references the mythical ten to one force ratio prescribed for counterinsurgency (Department of Defense [DoD], 2007, p. 1-13).

Quantifying attacks is a method for conventional planning; it helps turn the fog of war into black and white numbers that end-state minded Americans like and understand: how much will this cost, and can I afford it. However, an insurgency is like no other type of conflict; it exists within a state of gray, with no black or white solution. Analysts constantly search for numbers on manpower, material, and money in order to predict the outcome of insurgencies or to prescribe recommendations for winning. The common numerical comparisons used by authors and military personnel to analyze insurgencies are governed by what is known as the 10 to 1 ratio or expenditure ratio, the minimum requirement to defeat an insurgency. Even U.S. Presidents have used a 10 to 1 ratio as a basis of strategy. The Reagan Administration elected to increase financial pressure on the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, by facilitating the insurgent’s battle of exhaustion, based on the ten to one ratio (Mataxis, 1994, p. 7). The strategy worked and United States assistance allowed the Mujahedeen to erode the Soviet will to invest the resources and manpower necessary to succeed in Afghanistan. However, the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is clouded by the same question overarching all counterinsurgency, does victory or defeat rest on the ratio of manpower, or are policies and implementation the decisive components of counterinsurgency?

The 10 to 1 ratio is referred to so frequently that it has become a documented fact, yet remains a scientifically unfounded statistic. Without a documented source of statistical analysis on the 10 to 1 ratio; the ratio is only an assumption. This paper provides statistical data to prove that the 10 to 1 ratio is an invalid ratio; and thereby, the 10 to 1 ratio an invalid tool for analyzing and prescribing manpower for counterinsurgency operations. The data reveals a new ratio and draws conclusions on the relevance of prescribed force ratios for counterinsurgency.

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## ***Considerations for Analyzing Insurgent Numbers***

In all low intensity conflicts, force strength is extremely difficult to determine and analyze. Consequently, historians must weigh and account for a variety of factors and independent variables. Generally, the data collection issues fall into three categories: finding data, validity of data, and time ranges.

The nature of guerrillas is to remain unseen in order to preserve their information advantage. Thus, rarely do insurgents document composition, disposition, and strength. If compromised, this information could lead to the ultimate destruction of an entire movement. Protecting these types of descriptive and statistical information affords them the advantage of surprise and initiative.

All sides in a guerrilla conflict inflate and deflate numbers to serve their propaganda campaign. If a government wants external aid from the United States, it may deflate the security force numbers and inflate insurgent strength. If insurgents want to appear strong in order to recruit or influence tactics, they may inflate their numbers.

Insurgent manpower can shift with work seasons, weather conditions, or economic factors. Such events may cause numbers to spike for short time periods, but lack an impact strong enough to recruit insurgents for the duration of an insurgency. For example, a drought could cause the economy to suffer, thereby fostering mass unemployment. As a result, the number of recruits could surge during that period, but only until the economy stabilizes. In contrast, insurgent manpower may not be available to conduct actions during harvest seasons.

Time ranges and beginnings or ends are usually difficult to determine in low intensity conflicts. Insurgencies are often very long in duration, especially when compared to a coup. Also, numbers change as a revolutionary conflict evolves. If the insurgency is winning, the number of armed insurgents may continue to mount past the numbers of security forces. Likewise, if the insurgency is losing, or even sustains one major compromise or defeat, the numbers can drop very quickly. The inertia of perceptions based on propaganda, government official exodus, and insurgent coercion can cause manpower to snowball quickly in favor of either side. Time ranges and insurgent number within a time range will remain a weak point in the statistical foundation of any analysis on insurgency.

The aforementioned examples illustrate a small proportion of the complexities involved in analyzing an insurgency. Specifically, the collection of statistics is extremely difficult due to data, validity of data, and time. These collection difficulties associated with the low intensity conflict require assumptions in order to establish data sets.

## **Methods and Assumptions**

A ratio for defeating insurgencies requires the collection of data and the compilation of data in order to determine historical ratios. The collection of data and compilation of data represent two separate stages of the research and each requires a methodology. The case study methodology includes a random selection of insurgencies based on several screening criteria, including: post 1938 conflicts, exclusion of coup d'états, exclusion of civilian wars, and considerations concerning data. Additionally, the relative strength of victory is addressed in order to assuage critic's concerns over counterinsurgent victories that were followed by a subsequent successful revolution. The compilation of the data and methodology used to

determine ratios useful for analysis required the creation of data sets and consideration of several ratio calculation methods.

## Case Studies

The case studies serve as the foundation of this research. In order to provide the raw data to establish a data set and determine a ratio, case studies from a wide range of insurgencies were examined and force numbers extracted. Cases were selected at random from a period of 1938 to present in order to provide a global cross section of insurgency. The year 1938 was selected as the beginning of the time range based on revolutions in military affairs. Specifically, 1938 marks the beginning of the preponderance of open order conflict, clearly breaking from conventional closed order battle concepts. This is significant because conventional doctrine can affect how government forces are inclined to combat guerrillas. Thus, an additional independent variable, open or closed order indoctrinated government forces, could affect our analysis. Since, this is an effort to determine useful counterinsurgency manpower ratios in the modern military era, 1938 was selected as the beginning of the range and the closed order doctrine variable eliminated. The present day was selected as the end of the range. However, no current insurgencies were included in the case studies because forces numbers can fluctuate before the current conflicts are concluded.

The time duration of conflicts and fluctuating force numbers complicate the selection of forces numbers. As data permitted, force numbers were selected from the same time span. In the case of counterinsurgent victories, force numbers were selected during the insurgent force peak in order to determine the smallest force ratio that still resulted in counterinsurgent victory. Conversely, in the case of insurgent victories, force numbers were selected during the counterinsurgent force peak.

Many authorities in the field of low intensity conflict have ascribed to various types of insurgencies or groups of insurgencies, including the foco approach, championed by Che Guevara, and the Maoist three-stage model. However, this study does not break insurgencies into types. The case studies were selected from insurgencies at large within the time period. Critics may argue that the fundamental differences between the types insurgency bars comparison; for example, the short time duration of the foco approach eliminates government force build up, while the Maoist model generally has a time horizon that allows force buildup. However, the condition that underlines most insurgencies, social disequilibrium, develops over a period of time (McCormick, 2009). These conditions and time periods allow both the government and insurgent leaders to make choices involving security forces and armed resistance personnel. For this reason, the case studies were selected at random from a cross section of all types of insurgencies.

Geographic areas, including the topographical and cultural idiosyncrasies, have substantial influence on the conduct and outcomes of insurgencies. Specific geographic area was not a consideration for case study selection for two primary reasons. First, geography plays such a significant role and can be broken down into such small bites, such as the neighborhood or street level, that regardless of whatever geographic area is selected, it could always be argued as too large with too many independent variables. Thus, geographic area becomes too immense to subjectively quantify. Second, geographic considerations are largely irrelevant in the decision to prosecute counterinsurgent campaigns. An incumbent government, if it wishes to remain in power, has no choice whether to wage a counterinsurgency as an insurgency arises.

Expeditionary counterinsurgent efforts, such as the United States in Afghanistan, should consider the geographic affect on the probability of success and costs, but often do not, due to international and domestic security concerns. In order to maintain the broad applicability of this research, insurgencies were selected from around the world. Follow-on finite area studies can use the methodologies in this research to identify more specific cultural effects on force requirements.

Though coup d'états are revolutions and have the same goals or outcomes as insurgencies, coups are not included in this analysis. Techniques for dealing with coup's, either preventative or reactionary, do not involve a force build up or conflict that results in counterinsurgent versus insurgent forces. Specifically, coups involve part of the current government splitting and attempting to attain complete control of the government. Coups are the common in some areas of the world; especially in the Middle East, coups are the dominant form of revolutionary change. For these reasons, the counterinsurgency ratio may not be as important in some areas of the world.

In addition, revolutions involving a split government, civil war, were not included in this study. Each case has a clear government and counter-government force; no civil wars with clear focus on conventional combat were included despite the employment of guerrilla tactics during some civil war conflicts.

Each case selected had to have credible sources for the raw numbers of forces on each side. Additionally, the force numbers for each side within a reasonable, one year, time period significantly restricted the case studies. In many cases, credible data was available for one side, but not the other. Notably, it is much easier to find the data for the counterinsurgents rather than the insurgents.

The concept of strong versus weak win is a point of contention in this research. A strong win is defined as a counterinsurgent government defeating counter-government elements and neutralizing underlining conditions for social discontent; in other words, the insurgency does not reemerge, as in the case of the Japanese Meiji Restoration of 1868-1873 or Prussian reform Movement of 1807-1815 (McCormick, 2009). A weak win represents a situation in which the counterinsurgent forces neutralize the counter-government forces, specifically, the core cadre or underground leadership, but the government fails to address the underlining conditions of the social discontent such as wealth distribution, social services, or education. In the case of a weak win, a follow-on movement frequently occurs as was the case Philippine Revolution, 1899-1902. This study includes several weak wins, where several years later an insurgent group was successful. Among the case studies represented in this research, Madagascar is an excellent example. The expeditionary counterinsurgent forces defeated the Madagascar revolutionaries in 1949. However, passive resistance in the 1950s led to France granting Madagascar independence and withdrawing all expeditionary counterinsurgent forces from the island. Weak win counterinsurgent victories were included in this research for two reasons. First, in order to achieve a weak win, the government forces mobilized enough counterinsurgent forces to neutralize the insurgency. Second, if the governments had instituted social programs to establish social equilibrium in conjunction with their security victory, the governments would have achieved a strong win. Thus, the counterinsurgency forces were sufficient, but the social policies were weak. For these reasons, weak counterinsurgent victories were included in this study. A review of the case studies reveals that most weak win counterinsurgencies involved colonial states and expedition counterinsurgent forces.

## Ratio Calculation Method

Determining the proper ratio for the application of forces in an insurgency requires the creation of a data set and a method to analyze the data set. The data sets represent the numbers relevant for determination of a ratio for counterinsurgent victory. The creation of the data seems obvious: find the ratio for insurgencies. However, this only yields the average forces engaged in an insurgent conflict; it does not determine the ratio required for a counter-insurgent victory. The next logical step is analyzing only counterinsurgent victories; however, such a data set yields the historical average that counterinsurgencies have used in victorious circumstances, but not the minimum required for victory. Some counterinsurgency operations could have applied less combat power and still achieved victory. Indian forces in Sri Lanka represent one example. As a result of these problems, a range was determined to establish a realistic ratio. The data set of counterinsurgent victories naturally makes a ratio that is too high because some of the victories may have required fewer troops than the number used. The data set for insurgent victories clearly demonstrates that the counterinsurgent forces were too few. Thus, the proper application of forces must be some where in between the two ratios. If the 10 to 1 ratio does not fall within this range and is in fact lower, this research will successfully establish that the 10 to 1 ratio is invalid.

The ratio calculation is the method by which the data is computed into a ratio. The following charts provide ratios using three different methods. The first of which, Ratio Averaging (RA), is based on the ratios from the case studies. The second method directly beneath Ratio Averaging in Charts 2-1 and 2-2, Raw Ratio (RR), is a ratio based on the sums of the counterinsurgent and insurgent manpower; thus, sums of total forces mathematically transformed into a ratio. RR disproportionately represents each conflict because cases are inadvertently weighed according to the size of the counterinsurgent or insurgent forces. RA is the superior method because it weighs each case equally, thereby precluding conflicts with large numbers from skewing the data. For example, the case study on Sri Lanka has very large numbers in comparison to the American Revolution. Finding an average from the raw sums would cause the ratio to more closely reflect the Sri Lanka Case, rather than factoring the value of each conflict ratio. Additionally, world and country populations increase over time; as a result, more recent conflicts will naturally have larger raw numbers, thereby weighting recent conflicts over older conflicts. RA eliminates the influence of time on the data, and facilitates determination of a ratio that transcends time. RR remains in the charts for the reader to make comparisons. It is also interesting to note that despite this method, the range of the ratios is always below 10 to 1.

The data sets clearly expose some counterinsurgent anomalies. The counterinsurgent manpower ratio was overkill when compared to the insurgent ratio. Extreme or outlying ratios skew data because they cause the compiled ratio to improperly represent the minimum ratio required for counterinsurgent forces to attain victory. In order to reduce the effects of outlying data, case studies outside the standard deviation were excluded from the ratio compilation. The remaining case studies and their corresponding ratio are labeled Ratio from Range (RFR). RFR is the best method for compiling the data into useful ratios because it excludes counterinsurgent force overkill. Additionally, RFR excludes cases in which an insurgent victory was imminent. In these cases, the data was probably collected from a time period late in the insurgency. The RFR and standard deviation calculations are included in Charts 1-1 and 1-2.

The ratios are rounded to the nearest whole number. Consequently, .5 or greater is rounded up and .49 or less is rounded down. RFR was calculated for whole number ratios and ratios with one decimal place. The resulting RFR was the same; consequently, whole numbers were selected to facilitate digestion of the data.

## ***Analysis***

### **Insurgent Victories**

A single ratio to defeat an insurgency is impossible to determine because the breaking point, where troops exceeding X determines victory, is impossible to calculate from historical data due the unique factors of each insurgency. Rather, a range between insurgent victories and counterinsurgent victories is best for proscribing manpower for an insurgent conflict.

The insurgent victories data set forms the low end ratio range. The total counterinsurgent forces number 2,667,000. When divided by the insurgent forces, 955,200, the Raw Ratio is 3 to 1. The average of the ratios for each conflict, RA, for this data set is 3 to 1. The standard deviation for this data set is 9. Using the RA as the average, Korea, was excluded from the RFR because the ratio was more than 9 away from the average. The resulting Ratio from Range is 3 to 1. All three of these ratios are extremely close; this increases confidence in the RFR calculation. This ratio reflects the statistical fact that on average, in conflicts where counterinsurgent forces only have a 3 to 1 advantage or less, they will lose the conflict.

<b><u>Insurgent Victors</u></b>	<b>Counter Insurgents</b>	<b>Insurgents</b>	<b>Ratio</b>
<b>Afghanistan</b>	200,000	150,000	<b>1:1</b>
<b>Algeria '54-'62</b>	400,000	50,000	<b>8:1</b>
<b>Angola '75-'88</b>	110,000	100,000	<b>1:1</b>
<b>Bolivia</b>	18,000	5,000	<b>4:1</b>
<b>Cuba '53-'59</b>	12,000	3,000	<b>4:1</b>
<b>Revolution of French Cameroun '56-'60</b>	2000	2000	<b>1:1</b>
<b>Ethiopia '75-'82</b>	140,000	40,000	<b>7:2</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>	109,000	200,000	<b>1:2</b>
<b>Mozambique '84</b>	30,000	20,000	<b>3:2</b>
<b>Korea</b>	40,000	1200	<b>33:1</b>

<b>Vietnam</b>	1,606,000	384,000	<b>4:1</b>
<b>Total</b>	2,667,000	955,200	
		<b>Raw Ratio</b>	<b>3:1</b>
		<b>Ratio Average</b>	<b>6:1</b>
<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>Ratio from Range</b>	<b>3:1</b>

(Red shading indicates an outlying case and exclusion from the final ratio calculation, RFR.)

**Chart 1-1**

### **Counterinsurgent Victories**

The counterinsurgent victories data set forms the top of the ratio range. The total counterinsurgent forces number 607,078. When divided by the insurgent forces, 122,650, the Raw Ratio is 5 to 1, more than 10 away from the average. The resulting RFR is 4 to 1. The three ratios for this set have a greater range. Thus, the confidence is not as high for the top end of the range. As stated in the Methods and Assumptions section, the RFR will serve as the top end of the range for discussion. This ratio reflects the statistical fact that, on average, in conflicts where counterinsurgent forces have at least 4 to 1 advantage, they will win the conflict.

<b><u>COIN Victors</u></b>	<b>Counter Insurgent</b>	<b>Insurgents</b>	<b>Ratio</b>
<b>Argentina</b>	28,200	20,250	<b>1:1</b>
<b>Dhofar</b>	16,100	6,000	<b>3:1</b>
<b>El Salvador</b>	56,200	2,000	<b>28:1</b>
<b>Greece</b>	225,450	30,000	<b>8:1</b>
<b>Kenya</b>	30,500	12,000	<b>3:1</b>
<b>Madagascar</b>	16,000	16,000	<b>1:1</b>
<b>Malaysia</b>	62,020	7,000	<b>9:1</b>
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	2,000	2,000	<b>1:1</b>
<b>Philippines 50-54</b>	25,058	20,00	<b>1:1</b>



<b>Sri Lanka</b>	115,000	4,000	<b>29:1</b>
<b>Uruguay</b>	30,500	3,400	<b>9:1</b>
<b>Total</b>	607,078	122,650	
		<b>Raw Ratio</b>	<b>5:1</b>
		<b>Ratio Average</b>	<b>8:1</b>
<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>Ratio from Range</b>	<b>4:1</b>

(Red shading indicates an outlying case and exclusion from the final ratio calculation, RFR.)

**Chart 1-2**

### ***Analysis***

The data and ratio calculations establish statistically supported ratios that offer utility for counterinsurgent planning. The compiled and analyzed data on insurgency yields a range of 4 to 1 to 3 to 1. This historically founded ratio range completely invalidates the commonly referenced 10 to 1. The actual ratio exists somewhere between 4 to 1 and 3 to 1. Additionally, all counterinsurgent cases within the standard deviation achieved victory with less than a 10 to 1 ratio.

It is important to analyze the variations for the ratio between different methods for the top end for the range. As previously mentioned, each insurgency has unique factors, such as geography and culture, which make a direct comparison difficult. Additionally, other factors such as incumbent government type, counterinsurgency policy, and operational employment of manpower further complicate comparisons. The large variations in the ratio at the top end of the range, 8 to 1 for raw ratio through 4 to 1 for Ratio Averaging within the Range, indicate that independent variables such as policy and operational employment directly affect the number of forces required when a counterinsurgent force operationalizes a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan.

While the actual ratio is significantly lower than the previously cited 10 to 1, a ratio still exists. A counterinsurgent force must have three to four times as many security forces as the insurgents. This basic 4 to 1 can serve as a basic planning figure for counterinsurgent planners. Conversely, the 3 to 1 represents a significant threshold for insurgencies. Insurgent leaders can use this ratio for planning purposes as well; based on this analysis, when insurgent forces achieve a three to one ratio, they have a significantly higher chance of exhausting the incumbent government and achieving victory. The ratio also provides a general quantifiable number for insurgent growth models; specifically, a point in the growth model when insurgents achieve strategic breakout, as represented in Timothy Lomperis's models (1996). Strategies such as those used by the Reagan Administration in Afghanistan are viable because a 3 to 1 or 4:1 still allows an insurgency to spend less than the counterinsurgency and exhaust their forces.

The research reveals the importance of civilians and soldiers, both guerrilla and conventional. The civilian population is not considered in this study. The civilian populations are important because they compose the auxiliary of both the insurgent and counterinsurgents. During the Bougainville Conflict in Papua New Guinea, the civilian population was divided; the civilians split, providing guides and food to each side based on tribal affiliation. The civilian population is the recruiting base for both sides of a conflict. Policy, propaganda, control, and atrocities will determine which side the civilian population joins, as a soldier or auxiliary; consequently, it will alter the manpower ratio in favor of the insurgency or counterinsurgency. This highlights the importance of policies, propaganda, control, and atrocities; these factors factor directly into the manpower ratio.

## ***Conclusion***

Using data, this paper proves that 10 to 1 is an invalid ratio and thereby an invalid tool for analyzing and prescribing manpower for counterinsurgency operations. The data reveals that a ratio does exist, but it is significantly lower than previously thought. The compiled data sets contain conflicts in which insurgencies were defeated with numbers less than 3 to 1, such as the Philippines after WWII; and counterinsurgencies which lost with numbers exceeding 4 to 1, such as Algeria. These inconsistent variations bring into question the importance of manpower and suggest that policies and operational implementation of those policies are far more important than sheer force superiority. This study is intended to cause counterinsurgency military practitioners to question utility of increased manpower ratios that result from surges. The 2006 surge in Iraq may have created the perception that higher manpower is essential in counterinsurgency; yet as this study demonstrates; more favorable ratio do not always yield success. These facts beg consideration that policies and alliances with powerful social actors are far more important than manpower ratios. As the United States surges in Afghanistan are leaders cognizant of the historic facts presented in this study, more troops do not win counterinsurgencies.

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## **Annex A: Insurgent Victory Studies**

### ***Afghanistan 1979-1989***

The insurgency in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 demonstrates that money, technology and armor do not conquer countries; people are the decisive factor. There are two options, either win the hearts and minds of the population or flood the country with enough troops to control the area; the Soviets did neither and thereby decisively lost the war in Afghanistan. In 1985, 150,000 domestic and foreign guerrillas were conducting operations against the Afghan/Soviet combined forces (Joes, 2000, p. 288). The guerrilla strength is misleading for two reasons. Though large, the movement had no unity of command between group leaders; thus, the insurgent forces were weaker than their numbers indicate. However, due to the widespread support against the Soviet occupation and the government in Kabul, the insurgent auxiliary network included the majority of the people in Afghanistan.

<b><u>Afghanistan 1979-1988</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	30,000 Army 50,000 Kabul Forces	150,000	1:2
Foreign Support	120,000 Soviets	Unknown	
Total	200,000	150,000	<b>1:1</b>

**Chart 2-1**

### ***Algeria 1954-1962***

The image of victory is often complete domination. In the arena of small wars and insurgencies, victory is as gray and diverse as guerrilla warfare itself. Victory for guerrillas can range from avoiding destruction to receiving representation or secession. In Angola and Mozambique, victory was achieved with political representation and change. In Algeria, insurgent victory was clear, but not before a seven year revolution. Though the French Government had the insurgents isolated, Charles De Gaulle determined the military and financial pressure was not worth continued occupation. Consequently, France pulled out of Algeria.

<b><u>Algeria 1954- 1962</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	400,000 French	50,000 FLN	8:1
Foreign Support			
Total	400,000	50,000	<b>8:1</b>

**Chart 2-2**

## ***Angola 1975-1988***

Years of struggle against the colonial administration ended in 1975 when the Portuguese Government passed full control to the indigenous administration. Unfortunately, progress in Angola did not begin and the conflict did not end. The Portuguese pullout was primarily attributed to guerrilla resistance led by Jonas Savimbi. However, the administration of the government was not passed to the Savimbi; in fact, his group Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) received no representation in the new government. As a result civil war erupted between UNITA and the national government. Like many other African countries that became the Cold War battlefield, the thirteen-year civil war roped in multiple states on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Marxist national government had a forum of foreign support throughout the conflict, to include: Soviets, Cubans, and neighboring states. Savimbi appealed to the strategic security concerns of South Africa and the United States. Though Savimbi died in the conflict, in 1988 UNITA forced the bankrupt central government to privatize industry and hold national elections (Brogan, 1998, p. 17). During the election, UNITA won 30 percent of the seats in the National Assembly.

<b><u>Angola 1975-1988</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	100,000	50,000 under Jonas Savimbi	2:1
Foreign Support	9000 Cuban 1000 Soviet	50,000 South African	
Total	110,000	100,000	<b>1:1</b>

**Chart 2-3**

## ***Bolivia 1952***

In Bolivia, power concentration in the hands of the ruling elite came to an end in 1952. The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), was an organization focused on the need for social progress in Bolivia. The military leaders in administering the country in 1952 commanded an Army of 18,000 troops (Jureidini & La Charite & Cooper & La Brand, 1962, p. 159). Roughly 5,000 MNR forces revolted simultaneously throughout the country (Jureidini et al, 1962, p. 161). By gaining control of the major mining centers and exerting control over a portion of the cities, the MNR staged an election and gained a majority representation in the government.

<b><u>Bolivia 1952</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	18,000 Government	5,000 Movimiento Nacionalist Revolucionario	4:1

Foreign Support			
Total	18,000	5,000	<b>4:1</b>

**Chart 1-4**

### ***Revolution of French Cameron '56-'60***

The Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC) was a revolutionary group in French Cameroon with nationalist goals and clear ties to the French Communist Party. After the government outlawed the party in 1955, the party reorganized underground into an insurgent organization. Operations included terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and propaganda. The French exerted control over the colony through an indigenous government and police force. The French military, called the Gendarmerie in French colonies, consisted of 2,000 men and officers (Jureidini et al, 1962, p. 284). The most active of the insurgent groups was the Bamileke Tribe. This tribe and others maintained a force of 2,000 guerillas (Jureidini et al, 1962, p. 295). The UPC movement lost momentum and assimilated into the political scene after the French government voluntarily relinquished control to the indigenous political representatives. Results from the first election following French expulsion resulted in 22% of the seats allocated to the Bamileke.

<b><u>Revolution of Cameron 1956- 1960</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	2000 French	2000 Bamileke Guerrillas  Unknown Number of other Tribes	1:1
Foreign Support			
Total	2000	2000	<b>1:1</b>

**Chart 2-4**

### ***Cuba 1953-1959***

General Fulgencio Batista's inability to improve the lives of the people over the course of his dictatorship, despite widespread popularity at times, resulted in a political and social environment ripe for revolution. The young elite Fidel Castro, who engaged in politics and revolutionary tendencies since college, harnessed the dissatisfaction of the people to sustain and spawn a revolution. Batista dedicated a force of 13 regiments of 900 men in order to eliminate the revolutionary groups (Brennan, 1959, p. 155). Castro's tactical failure to damage a 1,000 man garrison proved the strategic hinge to unify the insurgency. Eventually, all guerrilla activities were coordinated under Castro, and a force of 3,000 guerrillas seized the capital

(Draper, 1961, p. 8). This seizure of the clear center of gravity for the Batista government and his evacuation from Cuba to the United States resulted in the establishment of an unopposed dictatorship in Cuba.

<b><u>Cuba 1953-1959</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	12,000 (COIN forces) UK other Army UK other Police	3,000	4:1
Foreign Support			
Total	12,000	3,000	<b>4:1</b>

**Chart 2-5**

### ***Ethiopia 1975-1982***

The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) won independence from Ethiopia with only 40,000 soldiers. The war lasted for seven years; however, the 140,000 man Ethiopian pacification forces were never able to hold territory in Eritrea (Brogan, 1998, p. 57). While the desert is often not a formidable escape for insurgents against a technologically advanced foe, the Ethiopians lack of an Air Force and their inability to protect supply routes resulted in the isolation of offensive units.

<b><u>Ethiopia 1975-1982</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	140,000	40,000 Eritrean Liberation Front	7:2
Foreign Support			
Total	140,000	40,000	<b>7:2</b>

**Chart 2-6**

### ***Indonesia 1945-1949***

Following the end of World War II, in August of 1945, the Republic of Indonesia declared independence from the Dutch. The Japanese occupation of the islands served as a catalyst for revolution in three respects. First, Japanese cruelty solidified nationalist sentiments. Second, with government positions devoid of their Dutch staff, the Indonesians were forced to fill the positions and learn on a very steep curve in order to maintain government functions for their people. The Japanese did not come equipped to govern or administer, and welcomed the native participation. Lastly, some Indonesians received training from the Japanese Army in order to



establish an island defense force. These developments would not have taken place under Dutch rule. An evolution in Indonesian confidence and competence occurred as a result of the Japanese occupation.

The Dutch reconstituted an Army following emancipation from the Germans and reoccupied its former colony with 109,000 soldiers. Though they were unable to repel the landing and occupation of Jakarta, the Japanese trained and equipped Republic of Indonesia Army expelled the Dutch with 200,000 soldiers (Jureidini et al, 1962, p. 58).

<b><u>Indonesia 1945-1949</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	109,000 Dutch	200,000 Indonesian Republican Army	1:2
Foreign Support			
Total	109,000	200,000	<b>1:2</b>

**Chart 2-7**

### ***Mozambique 1984***

Following World War II, the colonial powers began releasing countries to indigenous leaders for self-rule. African states began receiving independence during the height of the cold war during the 1970's and 1980's. Consequently these states became a battlefield for the competing ideologies of the time, Marxism versus Capitalism. After years of ruling elites and colonial exploitation, Mozambique sought to equalize the economic playing field in the state and experimented with a Marxist government. Limited economic growth, corruption, and no change in the quality of life resulted in revolution. In 1984, Guerilla fighters began operations against the government. Within a year the force balance stabilized at 30,000 National Soldiers and 12,000 guerrillas (Brogan, 1998, p. 92). The government, due to pressure from the guerrillas and a failing economy created a new constitution and established a market economy.

<b><u>Mozambique 1984</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	30,000	20,000	3:2
Foreign Support			
Total	30,000	20,000	<b>2:1</b>

**Chart 2-8**

## ***Korea 1960***

The Korean Revolution of 1960 is a clear historical example of the power of propaganda and the harnessing of the masses. “The April Revolution” reportedly began when less than 200 professors and a thousand students’ stimulated uprisings around Seoul that led to demonstrations of over 100,000 people (Jureidini et al, 1962, p. 457). The resulting chaos and no clear center of gravity for the revolution neutralized the deployment of the 40,000 ROK National Police (Jureidini et al, 1962, p. 445). The overwhelming mobs outnumbered and at times assimilated police forces into the demonstrations.

<b><u>Korea 1960</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	40,000	1200	33:1
Support		100,000 demonstrators	
Total	40,000	1200	<b>33:1</b>

**Chart 2-9**

## ***Vietnam 1965-1974***

The insurgency in Vietnam was the largest in history next to the Chinese Communist insurgency from 1927 to 1949. Counter insurgent forces in Vietnam, to include foreign soldiers, numbered 1.6 million (Joes, 2000, p. 243). A force of 84,000 Viet Cong and 300,000 North Vietnamese repulsed the staggering weight of 1.6 million counterinsurgency troops (Taylor, 1972, p. 383).

<b><u>Vietnam 1965-1974</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	1,000,000	84,000	12:1
Foreign Support	536,000 USA 50,000 Korean 20,000 Other	250,000 NVA 50,000 NVA in Laos	2:1
Total	1,606,000	384,000	<b>4:1</b>

**Chart 2-10**

Geography and a seemingly endless pool of manpower had a major impact on this conflict. If Vietnam had been an island like the Philippines, a peninsula like Korea, or even if the U.S. had not emplaced restrictions on itself with limited strategic rules of engagement, this conflict could have easily had a different outcome.

## **Annex B: Counter Insurgent Victory Studies**

### ***Argentina 1976-1977***

The insurgency in Argentina during the 1970's was known as the "Dirty War," due to the wide spread disappearances that took place during the counterinsurgency effort. Paul Lewis, an Argentina Historian and author, compiled an expansive list of statistics in his book entitled, *Guerrillas and Generals*. The insurgency consisted of both urban and rural guerrilla groups. The Urban group, the Montoneros, was the largest group in the country. Its armed numbers reached 20,000 personnel during the 1976-1977 period (Lewis, 2002, p. 47). The rural group, numbering 250 persons, was concentrated in the Tucuman area and known as Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo or ERP (Lewis, 2002, p. 106). For this study, these numbers were selected based on the credibility of Lewis's research, though estimates ranged as high as 30,000 and 5,000 for each group. In all likelihood, those estimate included a large number of supporting personnel rather than armed militants. Lewis (2002) estimates 28,250 personnel for the government counterinsurgent forces and notes that only 25,000 out of the 65,000 Army soldiers were committed to the counterinsurgency effort (p. 47). The insurgency ended after a military junta took control of the government and instilled harsh population and resource control measures.

<b><u>Argentina 1976-1977</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	25,000 Soldiers 3,250 Special Police	20,000 Montoneros 250 ERP	1:1
Foreign Support	NA	NA	
Total	28,250	20,250	<b>1:1</b>

**Chart 3-1**

### ***Dhofar 1962-1979***

In Oman, the province of Dhofar experienced an insurgency from 1962 to 1979. This is the only provincially focused case study used in this research. The Popular Liberation Front for the Occupied Arabian Gulf insurgents, seeking secession, reached an armed constitutes peak of 6000 personnel in 1968 (Beckett, 2001, p. 56). The Sultan of Oman's forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in the province numbered 9,600 Soldiers and were augmented by 500 British, 500 Iranian, and 500 Jordanian troops (Beckett, 2001, p. 57). The coalition slowly attrited insurgent forces during a prolonged strategy based on attrition, combined with a civil services improvement campaign that eventually lead to an insurgent self proclaimed defeat in 1976.

<b><u>Dhofar 1962-1979</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio

Opposing Forces	9,600	6,000	1:1
Foreign Support	500 British 500 Iranian 500 Jordanian	NA	NA
Total	11,100	6,000	<b>1:1</b>

**Chart 3-2**

### ***East Timor 1975-1987***

Portugal began preparing colonies for self-rule in the early 1970's. The heterogeneous populations, divided along religious, racial, and tribal lines, began infighting after colonial governments empowered one party or tribe with responsibility and control over the government. This infighting resulted in a triumph by the leftist Revolutionary front for an Independent East Timor FRETILIN. However, Indonesia seized the opportunity to invade East Timor and dominate the whole of the island. Insurgents used conventional tactics and were decimated in the early years of the campaign (Brogan, 1998, p. 212). Eventually, FRETILIN transitioned to guerrilla warfare, but failed to organize an effective resistance. In recent years, international political pressure has yielded the best results for East Timor.

<b><u>East Timor 1975-1987</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Forces 1972	30,000	20,000 Conventional Tactics	3:2
Forces 1987	20,000	1,000	20:1
Total	20,000	1,000	<b>20:1</b>

**Chart 3-3**

### ***El Salvador 1987***

The insurgency in El Salvador nearly resulted in the overthrow of the government, but United States aid shifted the scales in favor of the Salvadoran government. At the onset of unrest in 1980, Salvadoran security forces were approximately 10,000 men; the force ratio was 5 to 1, security forces to insurgents. The Salvadoran force increased to 56,000 by 1987, which resulted in corresponding security to the insurgent ratio of 28 to 1 (Joes, 2000, p. 266). The force increase is largely a result of 700 million dollars of military assistance and 2 billion dollars in military aid from the United States over the eight-year period from 1980 to 1987. This monetary aid facilitated the counter-insurgent force increase.

<u><b>El Salvador 1987</b></u>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	10,000	2,000	5:1
Foreign Support	200 USA		
Opposing Forces after US Aid	56,000	2,000	28:1
Total	56,200	2,000	<b>28:1</b>

**Chart 3-4**

### ***Greece 1945-1948***

During World War II, the Allies had representatives in Greece to assist in insurgent operations against the occupying Axis powers. The Russian communist ideology and Western democracy were already competing for power before the end of the war. British occupation of Greece brought democracy to the country; however, a strong contingent of communist revolutionaries occupied the north highlands of the country. While total guerrilla losses were 37,000 throughout the conflict, their strength never exceeded 30,000 (Averoff-Tossizza, 1978, p. 358). Due to conservation of resources and consolidation of colonial assets, the British required its 143,000 Greek occupation troops; thus, Britain relinquished responsibility of Greece to the United States. United States stewardship of Greece brought an entirely different approach to the insurgency. The United States only deployed a cadre of 450 U.S. advisors, who in turn facilitated the training of 225,000 Greek troops (Woodhouse, 1976, pp. 205-206). The U.S. counter-insurgent strategy was effective, and the Greek Army decisively defeated the insurgents in a forced conventional confrontation.

<u><b>Greece 1945-1948</b></u>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	225,000 Greek Soldiers	30,000 Communist Guerrillas	8:1
Foreign Support	450 USA		
Total	225,450	30,000	<b>8:1</b>

**Chart 3-5**

### ***Kenya 1952-1960***

The insurgency in Kenya from 1952 to 1960 was known as the Mau Mau uprising. The contest pitted British colonial administrators against an armed peasant force of 12,000 Mau Mau tribesmen (Beckett, 2001, p. 41). The colonial administration was able to divide the indigenous

tribes and recruit 25,000 local nationals; the Kikuyu Home Guard, who conducted the majority of force on force confrontation (Beckett, 2001, p. 123). British expeditionary forces included regiments of the 1<sup>st</sup> Lancashire Fusiliers, 4<sup>th</sup> Kings African Rifles [RAR] from Uganda, and 6<sup>th</sup> KAR from Tanganyika (McConnell, 2005, p. 35). A British counterinsurgent strategy divided the tribes, isolated the rebellious population, and restricted basic necessities, which forced the insurgent population to focus the majority of their effort on survival.

<b><u>Kenya 1952-1960</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	25,000 Home Guard 1,000 KAR	12,000	2:1
Foreign Support	1,500 British 1,500 Uganda 1,500 Tanganyika	NA	
Total	30,500	12,000	<b>3:1</b>

**Chart 3-6**

### ***Madagascar 1947-1949***

The Malagasy uprising began in the French Colony of present day Madagascar in 1947. Seeking independence from French rule, indigenous people across the island united to form Mouvement Democratique de la Renovation Malagache. The resistance lasted two years; due in part, to a mobilization and force build up of a French Expeditionary force of 16,000 troops. While casualty figures range up to 110,000 for this conflict, most deaths were probably unarmed civilians. A conservative estimate of armed insurgents includes 5,000 tried by a British judge and 11,000 killed in combat with French forces (Armed Conflicts Events Database [ACED], 2000). The conflict concluded in 1949 and represents one of the most brutal counterinsurgency campaigns in history.

<b><u>Madagascar 1947-1949</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	NA	16,000	1:1
Foreign Support	16,000 French	NA	
Total	16,000	16,000	<b>1:1</b>

**Chart 3-7**

## ***Malaysia 1948-1960***

The Malayan Emergency was an insurgency in present day Malaysia between British expeditionary forces and the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party. Beckett (2001) attests that 38% of the Chinese population in Malaya supported the insurgency, but the military wing, the Malayan National Liberation Army, only fielded 7,000 armed personnel (p. 143). British forces executed a counterinsurgent campaign plan that is both revered by historians and commonly cited as a case study. While the British government infrastructure in Malaya was 160,000 personnel, their tactical field force only numbered 22,200 British and 39,870 special constables; regular police officer were not included in this study due to their coverage of peaceful Malayan areas of the country (Komer, 1972, p. 20). The 160,000, largely indigenous, officials allowed leaders to isolate the Chinese population from the Malayan, conduct resettlement programs, increase intelligence operations, and increase social services to small portions of the disaffected population. The insurgency was complete in 1960 after the British spent the final six years hunting the insurgent network cadre in order to prevent resurgence.

<b><u>Malaysia 1948-1960</u></b>	<b>Counter Insurgents</b>	<b>Insurgents</b>	<b>Ratio</b>
<b>Opposing Forces</b>	<b>39,870 Special Constables</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>6:1</b>
<b>Foreign Support</b>	<b>22,200 British</b>	<b>NA</b>	
<b>Total</b>	<b>62,070</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>9:1</b>

**Chart 3-8**

## ***Papua New Guinea 1987-2002***

Papua New Guinea is a country representing 864 tribes, all with independent languages and cultures. The European colonial system and Australia did little to represent the people; the PNG government has not done much better since independence in 1975. The European leadership exploited the population equally, while extensive political corruption along tribal lines has strained the state and paralyzed growth. Such exploitation came to a head in 1987 when the separate island of Bougainville declared independence in response to the years under corrupt Copper Mine contracts and miserable work, environmental, and living conditions. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), led by Pepetua Sereo and Francis Ona, commanded a force of 2,000 insurgents. The PNG Army had a standing Army of 5,600 hundred troops; however, only 2,000 were proficient and actually employed in operations (May and Spriggs, 1990).

<b><u>Papua New Guinea 1989-1997</u></b>	<b>Counter Insurgents</b>	<b>Insurgents</b>	<b>Ratio</b>
<b>Opposing Forces</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>1:1</b>

Total	2,000	2,000	1:1
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Chart 3-9

### ***Philippines 1950-1954***

Greece was not the only place in a state of confusion after the collapse of the world systems and balances following World War II. The United States was engaged in another insurgent struggle in the Philippines following the Japanese expulsion. Luis Taruc was the leader of the Huk Rebellion. Following his defeat, he received pardon and became a political figure. His book, *He Who Rides the Tiger*, includes estimates of 20,000 insurgents against a government force of 25,000 on the island of Luzon (Taruc, 1967, p. 88). The United States deployed 32 officers and 26 enlisted soldiers to tip the scales in favor of democracy (Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, p. 1485). This small element forced the Philippine government to acknowledge inept policies and change them in order to solve the roots of social problems in the Philippines.

<b><i>Philippines 1950-1954</i></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	25,000	20,000	1:1
Foreign Support	58		
Total	25,058	20,000	1:1

Chart 3-10

### ***Sri Lanka 1983-2009***

The island of Sri Lanka is situated in the Indian Ocean. The influx throughout time of diametrically opposed religions complicated the political situation as areas became less isolated in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Sri Lanka is one such battlefield where the predominately Hindi Central Government is opposed to granting autonomy or representation to its Muslim minority. The minority formed an insurgent group called the Tamil Tigers. Tamil Tigers are a full spectrum insurgent group operating guerrilla forces and a cellular organization of informants and suicide bombers in urban areas.

As previously stated in this paper, superb policy or complete saturation of the resistance area of operation are the most successful ways to defeat an insurgency. The Sri Lanka government elected for complete saturation, as opposed to policy and integration. By harnessing its populous and naturally parental neighbor, India; Sri Lanka completely dominated the guerrilla areas of operation and refuge. The Tamil guerrilla forces were isolated and attrited down to double-digit numbers. By the time of Indian troop pullout in 1987, as a result of a newly elected President, an entire generation of Tamil resistance was virtually eliminated (Brogan, 1998, p. 253).



<b><u>Sri Lanka 1983-1987</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	50,000 Soldiers	2,000 Tigers 2,000 JVP Terrorists	13:1
Foreign Support	65,000 India		
Total	115,000	4,000	<b>29:1</b>

**Chart 3-11**

### ***Uruguay 1963-1973***

The Tupamaros or the National Liberation Movement, MLN, waged an insurgency in Uruguay from 1963-1973. These urban based insurgents mobilized due to worker discontent around socialist political leader Raul Sendic. While the movement garnered sympathy throughout the work corps of Uruguay, the violent members never surpassed 3,400 (Moore, 1978, p. 73). The incumbent government battled endemic poverty throughout the decade long struggle and enlisted support from United States Agency for International Development. In order to address the urban nature and recognizing that military forces may not be the optimal force for conducting insurgency, the government created a 20,000 man counterinsurgent force, the Metro Guard (Moore, 1978, p.47). However, after a military Coup in 1973, the counterinsurgent police and Army quickly destroyed the insurgent movement through intensive interrogations that ultimately revealed large portion of the insurgent network.

<b><u>Uruguay 1963-1973</u></b>	Counter Insurgents	Insurgents	Ratio
Opposing Forces	20,000 Metro Guard 10,500	3,400 Tupamaros	9:1
Foreign Support	NA	NA	
Total	30,500	3,400	<b>9:1</b>

**Chart 3-12**

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